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Abstract
Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually con-
sidered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different
approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led
to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too
vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by
chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological
Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear
relation to the empirical significance of sentences. However, his criteria for
sentences—translatability, verifiability, falsifiability, confirmability—are us-
able, and under the assumptions needed for the Carnap sentence approach,
verifiability, falsifiability, and translatability become equivalent. As a result
of the Carnap sentence approach, metaphysics is rendered analytic.
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1 Introduction
The search for a criterion of empirical significance is generally considered an
abject failure (see, e. g., Ruja 1961; Soames 2003, ch. 13). However, while it is true
that the ratio of successful to unsuccessful criteria is abysmally low, it obviously
just needs one successful criterion out of the many for the search to succeed. And
I will argue in the following that over the course of his career, Rudolf Carnap
not only contributed many of the unsuccessful criteria, but also the successful
one.
Carnap suggested as an informal necessary condition for empirical signifi-
cance that a sentence be translatable into a formal language. This criterion is
arguably empty. On the formal side, Carnap was engaged in two logically dis-
tinct but historically closely connected searches. On the one hand, he tried de-
veloping a criterion of empirical significance for terms. This search failed on a
number of levels, leading to criteria that were unmotivated, trivial, or both. On
the other hand, he tried developing a criterion for sentences; this search remained
well-motivated throughout his career, and the successful criterion is in its formal
structure very close to earlier suggestions. The biggest difference is the success-
ful criterion’s presumption of a very inclusive notion of ‘observation sentence’,
which would have been at odds with Carnap’s earlier views. And there are two
further plausible reasons why Carnap did not develop his successful criterion ear-
lier. First, the criterion relies on the Carnap sentence, which Carnap discovered
late in his career. Second, the criterion requires a very loose relation between
theoretical and observational terms, which Carnap only gradually came to allow.
A sort of corollary of the latter requirement is that Carnap’s successful criterion
cannot be used to criticize metaphysical sentences as meaningless, contrary to
his initial aim. Rather, metaphysical sentences are rendered analytic.
Since Carnap changed his terminology over the course of his career, and I
am interested in the relations between his different accounts of empirical signifi-
cance, I will translate Carnap’s different terms into my own. For one, I will use
the term ‘empirical significance’ or, when this does not lead to confusion, ‘signif-
icance’, while Carnap instead used ‘meaningfulness’, ‘cognitive significance’ and
a number of other terms. I will further speak systematically of sentences that
are empirically significant as ‘statements’, not as, for instance, ‘propositions’. As
in formal logic, expressions may be ill-formed and are thus not always sentences.
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A pseudo-statement may be either a non-significant sentence or an ill-formed ex-
pression. The use of the term ‘sentence’ has the advantage that it connects to the
technical criteria that Carnap has suggested, which all apply to sentences in some
logical languageL . It also connects easily to the logical notion of a formula. All
of Carnap’s technical criteria furthermore assume a distinguished sublanguage of
L , which I will call the ‘basic language’ B . In the texts discussed here, Carnap
calls it the ‘autopsychological basis’, the ‘physical language’, ‘protocol sentences’,
‘observation language’, and more. I will assume that B can be identified with
a set of sentences, and so I will speak of ‘B -sentences’. Typically, Carnap identi-
fies B -sentences by their logical structure and the terms that occur in them, in
which case I will speak of ‘B -terms’ (rather than ‘observational’ or ‘elementary
term’).1 I will call non-B -terms ‘auxiliary’ or ‘A -terms’ rather than ‘theoretical’
or ‘abstract terms’.
2 Informal Translatability
In “Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language”,2 Carnap
(1931b, 61) states that there are two ways for an expression to lack empirical
significance.
A language consists of a vocabulary and a syntax, i. e. a set of words
which have meanings and rules of sentence formation. These rules
indicate how sentences may be formed out of the various sorts of
words. Accordingly, there are two kinds of pseudo-statements: either
they contain a word which is erroneously believed to have mean-
ing, or the constituent words are meaningful, yet are put together
in a counter-syntactical way, so that they do not yield a meaning-
ful statement. [M]etaphysics in its entirety consists of such pseudo-
statements.
Thus the first kind of pseudo-statements consists of sentences containing non-
significant terms, the second kind of ill-formed expressions.
The second kind of pseudo-statement occurs when expressions accord with
the rules of historical-grammatical syntax, but violate the rules of logical syntax
(Carnap 1931b, 69). Such pseudo-statements can be hard to identify if they have
the same historical-grammatical form as significant sentences. Carnap (1931b, 68)
writes:
If grammatical syntax corresponded exactly to logical syntax,
pseudo-statements could not arise. If grammatical syntax differ-
entiated not only the wordcategories of nouns, adjectives, verbs,
1. More or less in keeping with Carnap’s and common terminology, I will use ‘term’ synony-
mously with ‘non-logical symbol’.
2. Arthur Pap translates the title more loosely as “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through
Logical Analysis of Language” (Carnap 1959b).
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conjunctions etc., but within each of these categories made the
further distinctions that are logically indispensable, then no pseudo-
statements could be formed.
The examples Carnap discusses in the remainder of his article are of two sorts.
One sort results from “type confusion” (Carnap 1931b, 75), where the types are
those of Russell’s type theory.3 In a type confusion, a word of one type is used
at a position in a formula that can only be used by a word of another type,
resulting in an ill-formed expression. An example of the other sort is Heidegger’s
well-known ‘The Nothing itself nothings’, which Carnap considers a pseudo-
statement because ‘nothing’ marks the negation of an existentially quantified
sentence and cannot be identified with a constant symbol (§5).
To criticize ‘The Nothing itself nothings’, Carnap compares three kinds
of expressions: Expressions in logical syntax (iiia), expressions in historical-
grammatical syntax that can be translated into statements in logical syntax (iia),
and expressions that cannot be translated into logical syntax (iib).
Sentence form iia [ . . . ] does not, indeed, satisfy the requirements
to be imposed on a logically correct language. But it is nevertheless
meaningful, because it is translatable into correct language. This is
shown by sentence iiia, which has the same meaning as iia. [T]he
meaningless sentence forms iib, which are taken from [Heidegger’s
text . . . ] cannot even be constructed in the correct language.
Thus Carnap considers it a necessary condition for significance that a sentence
can be translated into a sentence in logical syntax. If all terms that occur in the
translation are also significant (as is assumed for sentence iiia), the condition is
also sufficient.4
It is a major drawback of this translatability condition of significance that
it is informal: There is no formal way of deciding whether a statement in logi-
cal syntax is a correct translation of some expression in historical-grammatical
syntax. Thus Carnap in effect has to engage in the interpretation of Heidegger’s
text:
[W]e might be led to conjecture that perhaps the word ‘nothing’ has
in Heidegger’s treatise a meaning entirely different from the custom-
ary one. [ . . . ] But the first sentence of the quotation [of Heideg-
ger’s5] proves that this interpretation is not possible. The combina-
3. Rolf A. George’s translation of the Aufbau (Carnap 1928a) uses the more literal translations
‘object sphere’ for ‘type’ (Carnap 1967a, §29), and ‘confusion of spheres’ for ‘type confusion’ (§30).
4. Note that the translation into logical syntax is different from the translation into the formal
mode of speech (Carnap 1934, §74): Logical syntax is used to phrase object-sentences, which ex-
press claims of the empirical sciences, while the formal mode of speech is used to phrase syntactical
sentences, which express philosophical claims.
5. “What is to be investigated is being only and—nothing else; being alone and further—nothing;
solely being, and beyond being—nothing. What about this Nothing?” (Carnap 1931b, 69; cf. Heideg-
ger 1931, 9–10).
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tion of ‘only’ and ‘nothing else’ shows unmistakably that the word
‘nothing’ here has the usual meaning of a logical particle that serves
for the formulation of a negative existential statement.
Thus, in the end, critics of allegedly non-significant expressions must show that
they did not simply fail to grasp the meaning of perfectly fine statements. If the
language and the assumptions in the context of an expression are not fixed, they
hence have to guess the intention of the one who proposed the expression to de-
termine whether it is a significant sentence. But this problem can also be posed to
the proponents of such expressions. Speaking about a specific kind of question in
philosophy that may be non-significant, Carnap (1935, 79) states: “I do not know
how such questions could be translated into [any] unambiguous and clear mode;
and I doubt whether the philosophers themselves who are dealing with them are
able to give us any such precise formulation. Therefore it seems to me that these
questions are metaphysical pseudo-questions.” Carnap in effect turns around the
burden of proof: Rather than showing an expression non-significant, he demands
that its significance be shown by translation into logical syntax. This strategy
would later be used by Flew (1950, 258) in an influential argument against the
significance of theological expressions. As Flew puts it, someone may utter ‘God
loves us as a father loves his children’ with the standard meaning of ‘God’, ‘love’,
and so on, and thus with straightforward implications for the world (say, the ab-
sence of undeserved suffering). But in light of counterexamples, he may qualify
the hypothesis more and more and finally “may dissipate his assertion completely
without noticing that he has done so. A fine brash hypothesis may thus be killed
by inches, the death by a thousand qualifications.” If it is difficult for the propo-
nent of a hypothesis to realize its non-significance, it is much more difficult for
the critic to show its non-significance. Flew (1950, 259) responds to this problem
like Carnap: “I therefore put to the succeeding symposiasts the simple central
question, ‘What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a
disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?”.
Flew combines Carnap’s informal translatability condition with the demand
that every significant sentence must be falsifiable. In “Testability and Meaning”,
Carnap (1937, 3) distinguishes clearly between the two aspects: The question
about the criterion of empirical significance “refers to a given language-system L
and concerns an expression E of L [ . . . ]. The question is, whether E is meaning-
ful or not. This question can be divided into two parts: a) ‘Is E a sentence of L’?,
and b) ‘If so, does E fulfill the empiricist criterion of meaning’?” Flew’s question
thus assumes that the empiricist criterion of meaning is that of falsifiability. How-
ever, the question whether E is meaningful (i. e., significant) is but one kind of
question about the criterion of empirical significance. As Carnap (1937, 4) puts
it, a question of the second kind
concerns a language-system L which is being proposed for construc-
tion. In this case the rules of L are not given, and the problem is
how to choose them. We may construct L in whatever way we wish.
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There is no question of right or wrong, but only a practical ques-
tion of convenience or inconvenience of a system form, i. e. of its
suitability for certain purposes.
For instance, Carnap (1937, 5) states that the sentence S1, ‘This stone is now
thinking about Vienna’, would have been declared meaningless because it cannot
be translated into logical syntax (presumably because of a type confusion). “But
at present I should prefer to construct the scientific language in such a way that
it contains a sentence S2 corresponding to S1. (Of course I should then take S2
as false, and hence ∼S2 as true.)” However, with that much leeway in translating
sentences, it is not obviously impossible to translate ‘The nothing itself nothings’
into the logical syntax of some language. Thus the informal condition of trans-
latability is, if not empty, then at the least problematic, and the hope has to rest
on criteria of empirical significance that apply to sentences in logical syntax.6 In
the remainder of this essay, I will look at Carnap’s suggestions for such criteria.
3 Europe
Since Carnap’s criteria of empirical significance are connected to the notion of
meaning and the scientific language (Carnap 1935, 32), they are directly related to
his positions on the semantics of scientific theories. As far as his explicit procla-
mations are concerned, this leads to a natural grouping of his positions up to
“Testability and Meaning” (Carnap 1936, 1937) on the one hand and of his later
positions on the other. For in his earlier works, roughly those published while he
was in Europe, Carnap relied on the assumption that it is possible to develop all
the terms of science starting out from basic terms or sentences. His later works,
published during his time in the United States, explicitly assume that this is not
always expedient or even possible.7
With respect to the relation between basic and auxiliary sentences, Carnap
(1963a, §9) describes in his “Intellectual Autobiography” the development of logi-
cal empiricism as a gradual liberalization. Initially, every kind of knowledge “was
supposed to be firmly supported” by the experiences as described by Wittgen-
stein’s principle of verifiability, “which says that it is in principle possible to
obtain either a definite verification or a definite refutation for any meaningful
sentence” (57). But even the early Carnap was more tolerant than that, for some
of his criteria also allowed (non-definite) confirmation and disconfirmation. One
central question in the following, however, will concern the relations between
the many different criteria.
6. Marhenke (1949/1950) comes to the opposite conclusion because he ignores the problems
with the informal translatability condition and, contrary to Carnap, assumes that inference rules
are only applicable to significant sentences.
7. Even in Carnap’s early works, however, his later position occurs as an undercurrent (Lutz
2012, §3.6.1).
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3.1 Criteria for Sentences
In the Aufbau, Carnap (1928a, cf. §§38–39) describes how to translate every sci-
entific sentence into a basic (“autopsychological”) sentence.8 Translatability typi-
cally requires some background assumptions which, for convenience of notation,
I will treat as one long conjunction ϑ.
Definition 1. Sentence σ is (non-trivially) translatable into languageB by sen-
tence ϑ if and only if there is a sentence β in B such that ϑ ` σ ↔ β (and
ϑ 6`β, ϑ 6` ¬β).
In some of Carnap’s elucidations, the background assumptions are expressed
by the rules of inference: “We say of a sentence P that it is translatable (more
precisely, that it is reciprocally translatable) into a sentence Q if there are rules,
independent of space and time, in accordance with which Q may be deduced
from P and P from Q” (Carnap 1932/1933, 166). This is inessential for most of
what follows, but will be picked up again in §6.1. In the Aufbau, the background
assumptions are explicitly given as the definitions of the constitutional system,
and thus they are determined by the reconstructed sciences (Carnap 1928a, §179).
As far as the reconstruction of scientific theories is concerned, the basic sentences
are those containing only logical (including set theoretical) terms (§107) and a
single basic relation interpreted as a recollection of similarity (§108). To include
values in the reconstruction, emotions and possibly volitions have to be included
in B as well. These then can be used to construct value experiences, which
in turn can be used to construct values (§152; cf. Mormann 2007, §2). Carnap
(1928a, §133) is explicit, however, that emotions and volitions are probably too
varied to be useful for establishing intersubjective agreement. Expressions that
cannot be translated into B -sentences according to definition 1 are not signifi-
cant. For instance, Carnap (1928a, §176) states that the concept of reality that
is at issue in the debate between realism, idealism, and phenomenalism “cannot
be constructed in an experiential constructional system; this characterizes it as
a nonrational, metaphysical concept.” Those expressions about which the three
positions seem to disagree are therefore all in the field of metaphysics (§178),
where ‘metaphysics’ refers to “the result of a non-rational, purely intuitive pro-
cess” (§182).9 Structurally, Carnap here relies on the criterion of significance
as spelled out in “Testability and Meaning”: An expression must belong to the
language of the constructional system, and it must fulfill the criterion of signifi-
cance of this constructional system, in this case translatability. Purely intuitive,
non-rational processes do not fulfill this criterion according to Carnap.
Later, Carnap (1931a, 452, all translations are mine) criticizes metaphysical
expressions not for lack of translatability, but based on a different criterion. He
8. He also claims that it is in general possible to translate all scientific sentences into a variety
of different basic languages, for example the physical language (Carnap 1928a, §§54–60).
9. Carnap (1928a, §179) of course does not think that metaphysics in the sense of “basic knowl-
edge”, i. e., “logical, experiential, constructional order” is non-significant. In this case, however, he
suggests using the terms ‘basic science’ or ‘cosmology’.
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states that “logical analysis comes to the conclusion [ . . . ] that the so-called meta-
physical sentences are pseudo-sentences, since they stand in no deductive rela-
tion (neither positive nor negative) to the sentences of the protocol-language.”10
The protocol sentences here are literals (atomic sentences or negations thereof)
about “experiences, perceptions, but also feelings, thoughts, etc.” (Carnap 1931a,
437)11. Protocols are finite sets of such literals. In the following, I will treat the
(finite) conjunctions of the members of a protocol as a singleB -sentence (hence
B -sentences are not protocol sentences, but conjunctions thereof). As in the
Aufbau, B -sentences can thus contain emotional terms, but unlike in the Auf-
bau, the sentences are restricted in their logical form; they do not, for instance,
contain quantifiers.
Introducing some more a-historical terminology for the sake of precision, I
will say that according to Carnap, metaphysical sentences are pseudo-statements
because they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable by protocols:12
Definition 2. Sentence σ is (non-trivially) verifiable in language B relative to
ϑ if and only if there is a sentence β in B such that ϑ ∧β 6` ⊥ and ϑ ∧β ` σ
(and ϑ 6` σ ).
Definition 3. Sentence σ is (non-trivially) falsifiable in language B relative to
ϑ if and only if there is a sentence β inB such that ϑ ∧β 6` ⊥ and ϑ ∧β ` ¬σ
(and ϑ 6` ¬σ ).
The background assumptions ϑ here contain, as in the Aufbau, the laws of
nature. Carnap is silent about whether the laws must be known. If they must be
known, significance depends on the current state of science. If they do not have
to be known, significance is not so dependent. However, at any point in time one
can then only make preliminary claims about significance.13 The demand that β
be compatible with ϑ stems from Carnap’s position that the basic sentences must
be possible according to the laws of nature; this stance is in opposition to Schlick,
who only demands that basic sentences be logically possible (Carnap 1936, 423;
cf. Friedl and Rutte 2008). In the following, I will suppress the references to ϑ
andB when this does not lead to ambiguity.
Shortly after demanding verifiability or falsifiability from significant sen-
tences, Carnap (1932/1933, 166) states that a person “tests (verifies) a system-
sentence by deducing from it sentences of his own protocol language, and com-
paring these sentences with those of his actual protocol. The possibility of such
a deduction of protocol sentences constitutes the content of a sentence. If a sen-
10. “Aber die logische Analyse kommt zu dem Ergebnis [ . . . ], daß die sog. metaphysischen
Sätze Scheinsätze sind, da sie in keinem Ableitungsverhältnis (weder einem positiven noch einem
negativen) zu den Sätzen der Protokollsprache stehen.”
11. “Erlebnisse, Wahrnehmungen, aber auch Gefühle, Gedanken usw.”
12. This terminology follows that of Hempel (1950, 45–48).
13. As Justus’s criticism (2011, 429–30) of a criterion by Sober (2008, §2.14) shows, this dilemma
is still under discussion.
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tence permits no such deductions, it has no content, and is meaningless.” This
suggests
Definition 4. Sentence σ has (non-trivial) content in B relative to sentence ϑ
if and only if there is a sentence β in B such that ϑ 6` β and ϑ ∧ σ ` β (and
ϑ 6` ¬σ ).
The B -sentences are again conjunctions of literals (Carnap 1932/1933, 165–
66). The rules of inference (here given by ϑ ) must be “independent of space and
time” (166), which suggests that they can express laws of nature, where Carnap
is again silent about whether these laws must be known.
Somewhat surprisingly, definition 4 provides but one of the conditions under
which Carnap (1931a, 452) claimed a sentence to be significant shortly before:
Claim 1. If B contains with every sentence also its negation,14 then a sentence is
(non-trivially) falsifiable relative to ϑ if and only if it has (non-trivial) content rela-
tive to ϑ.
Proof. ϑ∧β ` ¬σ if and only if ϑ∧σ ` ¬β. ϑ∧β 6` ⊥ if and only if ϑ 6` ¬β.
And at around the same time, Carnap (1931b, 62) discusses the significance
of a word (like ‘stone’) using elementary sentences S (like ‘This diamond is a
stone’):
[F]or an elementary sentence S containing the word an answer must
be given to the following question, which can be formulated in vari-
ous ways:
1. What sentences is S deducible from, and what sentences are de-
ducible from S?
2. Under what conditions is S supposed to be true, and under
what conditions false?
3. How is S to be verified?
4. What is the meaning of S?
(1) is the correct formulation; formulation (2) accords with the
phraseology of logic, (3) with the phraseology of the theory of
knowledge, (4) with that of philosophy (phenomenology).
In (1), the sentences entailing S and entailed by S are subsequently restricted to
protocol sentences. Call the weakestB -sentence that entails S the ground G(S)
of S, and the strongest B -sentence that is entailed by S the content C (S) of S.
Then (1) identifies the meaning of S with the ground and the content of S, if
they can be expressed in a single B -sentence: The ground of S is equivalent to
the disjunction of all protocol sentences entailing S, and the content is equivalent
14. Note that this puts additional restrictions on protocols.
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to the set of all protocol sentences entailed by S.15 The relation between (1) and
(4) then suggests that the ground and the content together determine a sentence’s
meaning, so that somehow, any sentence σ can be translated into its ground G(σ)
and its content C (σ). However, by definition,
G(σ)∧ϑ ` σ ∧ϑ `C (σ)∧ϑ , (1)
where I have already taken the background assumptions into account. By assump-
tion, G(σ) and C (σ) areB -sentences, and so σ is translatable intoB if and only
if G(σ)∧ϑ ` C` (σ)∧ϑ. Obviously, this is not always fulfilled.
Put in a slightly different way, a sentence that is verifiable or has content may
not be translatable. In fact, one can state something even stronger:
Claim 2. There are sentences that are non-trivially verifiable in someB and have
non-trivial content inB relative to some ϑ without being translatable intoB by
ϑ.
Proof. Choose ϑ to be a logical truth and some µ that is not verifiable and has no
content (say, a logically contingent sentence containing only terms not occurring
inB ), and choose two sentences β and β′ fromB whose disjunction is also in
B . Then (µ ∧β′) ∨β can be derived from β and entails β ∨β′, but it is not
equivalent to aB -sentence.
Thus some sentences are even verifiable and have content without being
translatable into B . There are, then, three different kinds of relations (falsifia-
bility, verifiability or falsifiability, and translatability), all of which seem to de-
termine on their own whether a sentence is significant. And it is as if Carnap
assumes that all of these relations are equivalent, even though they are clearly
not.16
In addition, in Pseudoproblems of Philosophy Carnap (1928b, 327) already al-
lows early on not only verification and falsification, but also confirmation and
disconfirmation:
If a statement p expresses the content of an experience E , and if the
statement q is either the same as p or can be derived from p and
prior experiences, either through deductive or inductive arguments,
then we say that q is ‘supported by’ the experience E . A statement
p is said to be ‘testable’ if conditions can be indicated under which
15. For the ground of S, the equivalence can be expressed only in languages that allow disjunc-
tions with infinitely many disjuncts.
16. There is an additional wrinkle whose implications I will not discuss in the following: Ac-
cording to Carnap (1932), it was Neurath (1932) who first suggested treating protocol sentences
and system-sentences as from the same language, which suggests that Carnap assumed in earlier
discussions that the protocol sentences are in one language, the remaining (“system-”)sentences in
another. But Carnap already assumed in the Aufbau that all scientific terms are definable in basic
terms, and thus the basic sentences are a subset of the scientific language. Thus it is not clear in
what way Neurath’s suggestion was novel.
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an experience E would occur which supports p or the contradictory
of p. A statement p is said to have ‘factual content’, if experiences
which would support p or the contradictory of p are at least con-
ceivable, and if their characteristics can be indicated.
It seems that conditions under which an experience would occur are indicated
byB -sentences with spatio-temporally restricted quantifiers (Carnap’s example
is ‘In the next room is a three-legged table’). Conceivable experiences seem to
be described by spatio-temporally unrestrictedly quantified sentences (Carnap’s
example is ‘There is a certain red color whose sight causes terror’). By allowing
the inference of p or ¬p through deductive arguments, Carnap stipulates a sen-
tence to be significant if it is verifiable or falsifiable. But beyond that, he also
allows inductive inferences. Since he does not spell out what kind of inductive
inferences he has in mind, it is hard to say how much of a deviation from verifi-
ability and falsifiability this addition is, but for the sequel, it will be informative
to look at probabilistic inference. During Carnap’s early years, its use was espe-
cially championed by Reichenbach (Carnap 1963b, 58; Reichenbach 1951, §i), but
as discussed below, Carnap would later also suggest this approach.
The standard definitions of probabilistic confirmation and disconfirmation
(e. g., Howson and Urbach 1993, 117) can be used to define confirmability and
disconfirmability as follows:
Definition 5. Assuming all occurring probabilities are well-defined, sentence σ
is probabilistically confirmable inB relative to sentence ϑ if and only if there is
a sentence β inB such that
P(σ |β∧ϑ)> P(σ |ϑ) .
A sentence σ is probabilistically disconfirmable in B relative to sentence ϑ if
and only if there is a sentence β inB such that
P(σ |β∧ϑ)< P(σ |ϑ) .
Note that this definition is not one of total confirmability, since the proba-
bility of σ might simply be raised minimally from a very low value to a value
almost as low. Analogously, it is not a definition of total disconfirmability.
Unlike verifiability and falsifiability, which do not entail each other, con-
firmability and disconfirmability are equivalent (see appendix):
Claim 3. If all occurring probabilities are defined and B contains with every sen-
tence also its negation, then σ is disconfirmable if and only if σ is confirmable.
As is often discussed (e. g., Howson and Urbach 1993, 119–20), if inductive
inferences are treated as probabilistic, falsifiability entails confirmability in all
interesting cases:
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Corollary 4. If all occurring probabilities are defined, B contains with every
sentence also its negation, P(β |ϑ) 6= 0 for each B -sentence compatible with ϑ,
P(σ |ϑ) 6= 0, and σ is falsifiable relative to ϑ, then σ is confirmable relative to ϑ.
Proof. If β∧ϑ ` ¬σ , then P(σ |β∧ϑ) = 0< P(σ |ϑ) so that σ is disconfirmable.
By claim 3, it is confirmable.
Informally, a sentence σ is confirmed when a B -sentence that would have
falsified σ turns out false. This result and claim 1 have the immediate
Corollary 5. If all occurring probabilities are defined, B contains with every
sentence also its negation, P(β |ϑ) 6= 0 for each B -sentence compatible with ϑ,
P(σ |ϑ) 6= 0, and σ has content relative to ϑ, then σ is confirmable relative to ϑ.
A less often mentioned consequence of probabilistic inferences is that verifi-
ability entails disconfirmability:
Corollary 6. If all occurring probabilities are defined, B contains with every
sentence also its negation, P(β |ϑ) 6= 0 for each B -sentence compatible with ϑ,
P(σ |ϑ) 6= 1, and σ is verifiable relative to ϑ, then σ is disconfirmable.
Proof. If β∧ϑ ` σ , then P(σ |β∧ϑ) = 1> P(σ |ϑ) so that σ is confirmable. By
claim 3, it is disconfirmable.
Informally, a sentence σ is disconfirmed when aB -sentence that would have
verified σ turns out false. Together, claim 3 and its corollaries 4 and 6 show that,
with the right choice of inductive inference, speaking of confirmability already
includes disconfirmability, verifiability, and falsifiability.
In “Testability and Meaning”, Carnap (1936, 420) speaks of confirmability,17
and again claims translatability, this time of an inductive kind.
Obviously we must understand a sentence, i. e. we must know its
meaning, before we can try to find out whether it is true or not. But,
from the point of view of empiricism, [if] we knew what it would
be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what
its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which
we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the
same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense
identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a
sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible.
17. He adds: “If by verification is meant a definitive and final establishment of truth, then no
(synthetic) sentence is ever verifiable, as we shall see. We can only confirm a sentence more and
more.” As far as the deducibility fromB -sentences is concerned, Carnap’s argument for his claim
is essentially that universally quantified sentences cannot be verified. Carnap’s more general point
is that B -sentences themselves are never absolutely secure and thus also holds for falsifiability
(Carnap 1936, §6).
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Thus it seems that having meaning is identical to being confirmable or discon-
firmable (and thus confirmable and disconfirmable) and also identical to being
translatable, albeit by fiat: In empiricism, the meaning of a sentence is stipulated
to be given by the set of sentences that confirms it and the set of sentences that
disconfirms it.
I now want to show that the technical aspect of Carnap’s account in “Testabil-
ity and Meaning” does not illuminate this relationship. Carnap (1936, 435) calls
the confirmation of a sentence S “directly reducible to a class C of sentences” if
“S is a consequence of a finite subclass of C ” (complete reducibility of confirma-
tion) or “if the confirmation of S is not completely reducible to that of C but if
there is an infinite subclass C ′ of C such that the sentences of C ′ are mutually
independent and are consequences of S” (direct incomplete reducibility of con-
firmation). This definition is the first in a long chain that eventually leads to the
requirement of confirmability, which “suffices as a formulation of the principle
of empiricism” (Carnap 1937, 35). Carnap’s path to the principle of empiricism is
somewhat circuitous, but significantly simplified when taking into account that
it becomes trivial with the next link: Carnap (1936, 435) calls the confirmation of
S “reducible to that of [a class of sentences] C , if there is a finite series of classes
C1,C2, . . . ,Cn such that the relation of directly reducible confirmation subsists
1) between S and C1, 2) between every sentence of Ci and Ci+1 ( i = 1 to n− 1),
and 3) between every sentence of Cn and C .” And this leads to
Claim 7. If the class C of sentences allows the direct incomplete reducibility of at
least one sentence γ , then the confirmation of every sentence σ is reducible to that of
C .
Proof. For any sentence σ , if γ is directly incompletely reducible to that of C ,
so is γ ∧ σ , which can therefore be in C1. Then the confirmation of σ can be
completely reduced to that of C1 := {γ ∧σ} because {γ ∧σ}  σ and {γ ∧σ} is
a finite subset of itself. Thus the confirmation of σ is directly reducible to that
of C1, whose confirmation is directly reducible to that of C , and therefore the
confirmation of σ is reducible to that of C .
If a language contains infinitely many constants {ci | i ∈ I } for points in space-
time,18 the sentence ‘It will always be everywhere cold’ is an incompletely di-
rectly reducible sentence γ , since the temperature at each point in space-time is
logically independent from the temperature at any other and thus γ entails the
infinite set of logically independent sentences Ω∗ := {ðIt is cold at ciñ | i ∈ I }.
Since the reducibility of confirmation to a class of sentences is trivial, all
other definitions that build on it collapse, too: The confirmation of a sentence
S is reducible to that of a class C of predicates if the confirmation of S “is
reducible [ . . . ] to a not contravalid sub-class of the class which contains the
full sentences of the predicates of C and the negations of these sentences” (435–
36); call such a sub-class a confirmation class. Full sentences are literals, and a
18. This is what Carnap (1936, 433–34) seems to assume.
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contravalid sentence is incompatible with the laws of nature, where Carnap is
again silent about whether these laws have to be known (Carnap 1936, 432–
434). Because of claim 7, if some confirmation class Ω allows the direct incom-
plete reducibility of at least one sentence γ , the confirmation of any sentence
σ is reducible to Ω. (In the above example, Ω∗ is a confirmation class for γ if
{ci | i ∈ I } ∪ {λx(It is cold at x)} ⊆ C .) Thus the confirmation of any sentence
σ is reducible to that of C . If now C is contains only observable predicates (B -
predicates), σ is confirmable, because a “sentence S is called confirmable [ . . . ] if
the confirmation of S is reducible [ . . . ] to that of a class of observable predicates”
(456). Since nothing was assumed about σ , the principle of empiricism is then
met by any sentence whatever.
As Wagner (2014, 40–41) has shown in response to the above, Carnap (1950b,
40a) changes the definition of direct incomplete reducibility in a reprint of
“Testability and Meaning” in a way that blocks the above trivialization proof:
Now, “the confirmation of a a non-contravalid sentence S is directly incompletely
reducible to that of C , if the confirmation of S is not completely reducible to
that of C but if there is an infinite subclass C ′ of C such that the sentences of
C ′ are mutually independent and are consequences of S by substitution alone.”
This restricts the entailment needed for direct incomplete reductions to univer-
sal instantiations, that is, S must be a universally quantified formula ∀xϕ(x) and
specifically cannot be a conjunction as assumed in the proof of claim 7.19
It is not known why Carnap made these two changes, but one can make
educated guesses: The first addition avoids an obvious trivialization: If S is con-
travalid, it entails every sentence, and thus specifically those of C ′. Thus it is di-
rectly incompletely confirmed and, being contravalid, can be used to completely
confirm any sentence whatever. The second addition avoids the less obvious triv-
ialization of claim 7 and there is a somewhat speculative reason to think that this
was exactly Carnap’s intention: Five years before the reprint, Hempel (1945, 103–
4) had pointed out that the conjunction of three intuitively plausible conditions
of adequacy for confirmation is trivial. According to the entailment condition, if
" ` %, then " confirms %. Thus, specifically, any sentence γ confirms itself. The
converse consequence condition demands that if " confirms % and %′ ` %, then
" also confirms %′. Thus γ confirms γ ∧ σ , where σ is any sentence whatever.
According to the special consequence condition, if " confirms % and % ` %′, then
" confirms %′. Thus γ confirms σ . It is easy to see that direct incomplete re-
ducibility fulfills the converse consequence condition and complete reducibility
fulfills the special consequence condition. The proof of claim 7 essentially fol-
lows Hempel’s trivialization proof, skipping the use of the entailment condition
by assuming that there is a directly incompletely confirmed sentence. Since in all
likelihood Carnap had analyzed Hempel’s conditions of adequacy before prepar-
ing “Testability and Meaning” for the reprint,20 he could easily have seen this
19. I thank Pierre Wagner for very helpful discussions of this publication of Carnap’s.
20. Carnap (1950a, §87) discusses the conditions at length.
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connection.
Unfortunately, Carnap’s modification does not avoid the trivialization of his
criterion. To see why, note first that if S must have the form ∀xϕ(x), then C ′
must have the form {ϕ(ai ) | i ∈ I }, where C ′ has infinite cardinality and ϕ(ai ) 6`
ϕ(a j ),¬ϕ(a j ) for any i , j ∈ I , i 6= j . Carnap’s intent here seems to be something
along the lines of a confirmation by (infinite) enumerative induction. In other
words, he seems to presume that ðai 6= a jñ ∈ C if i 6= j , that is, ϕ is to be
predicated of infinitely many objects. But as became clear through Goodman’s
“new riddle of induction” (Goodman 1965, §iii.4), it is always possible to take a
formula ϕ and craft a new formula ϕ∗ that predicates ϕ of the objects used in
the induction, but predicates a completely different formula of all other objects.
This insight, which unfortunately came too late for Carnap to have taken it into
account for the reprint, can be used to trivialize Carnap’s new criterion. Unlike
in Goodman’s argument, it is not even necessary to use ϕ∗ as the definiens of a
new predicate; ϕ∗ itself already suffices. The only additional assumption is that
it is possible to identify at least one object that is not used in (or can be left out
of) the induction or, in Carnap’s terms, that is not used for (or can be left out
of) the direct incomplete confirmation of a sentence.
Claim 8. According to Carnap (1950b), if the class C of sentences allows the direct
incomplete reducibility of the confirmation of at least one sentence γ (by {ϕ(ai ) | i ∈
I }) and contains the sentences ða j 6= bñ, j ∈ J for some J ⊆ I of infinite cardinality,
then the confirmation of every sentence σ is reducible to that of C .
Proof. If the confirmation of γ is reducible to that ofC , then there is a setC ′ ⊂C
of infinite cardinality of the form {ϕ(ai ) | i ∈ I }. By assumption, {a j 6= b | j ∈
J } ⊂ C . Thus for each j ∈ J , ϕ(a j )∧ a j 6= b is entailed by a finite subclass of C
(namely {ϕ(a j ),a j 6= b}, and so is [ϕ(a j )∧a j 6= b ]∨ [a j = b ∧σ], where σ is any
sentence whatever. The confirmation of the latter sentences is thus completely
reducible to that of C .
By construction, the set C2 = {[ϕ(a j ) ∧ a j 6= b ] ∨ [a j = b ∧ σ] | j ∈ J } has
infinite cardinality. Since each of its elements is a universal instantiation of the
sentence γ ′ = ∀x [ϕ(x)∧ x 6= b ]∨[x = b ∧σ], the confirmation of γ ′ is directly
incompletely reducible to the confirmation of C2. γ ′ entails σ , and thus the
confirmation of σ is completely reducible to the confirmation of C1 = {γ ′}.
Therefore, the confirmation of every sentence σ is reducible to that of C .
The additional assumption of the proof is fulfilled in the example given above:
If a language contains infinitely many constants {ci | i ∈ I } for points in space-
time, the sentence ‘It will always be everywhere cold’ is incompletely directly
reducible, and one can choose any constant cg , g ∈ I to build the sentence ‘It is
cold at every space-time point different from cg , and for cg , σ holds’. And again,
since the reducibility of confirmation to a class of sentences is trivial, all other
definitions that build on it collapse.
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In conclusion, Carnap’s technical contribution in “Testability and Meaning”
to the search for a criterion of empirical significance was not successful. His in-
formal discussion of the relation between confirming sentences and confirmed
sentence provide a tantalizing suggestion for a thorough and precise empiricism,
however, also because it relates to his informally suggested equivalence of veri-
fiability, falsifiability, and translatability. Carnap also indirectly contributed an-
other informal insight. Or rather, he steered clear of an unfortunate development
in the search for a criterion of significance that started, as far as I can tell, with
A. J. Ayer.
After one unsuccessful attempt at defining a criterion of empirical signifi-
cance (Ayer 1936, 38–39, cf. Lewis 1988a), Ayer (1946, 13) proposes two defini-
tions. The first essentially stipulates that a sentence is directly verifiable if and
only if it has content relative to any other observational sentence. In his second
definition, Ayer proposes saying that
a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following con-
ditions: first, that in conjunction with certain other premises it en-
tails one or more directly verifiable statements which are not de-
ducible from these other premises alone; and secondly, that these
other premises do not include any statement that is not either ana-
lytic, or directly verifiable, or capable of being independently estab-
lished as indirectly verifiable.
In a review, Church (1949) showed that for any sentence, as long as there are three
logically independentB -sentences, the sentence or its negation is indirectly veri-
fiable, and thus Ayer’s amended criterion is close to trivial as well. The criterion
was followed by a slew of further amendments and new trivialization proofs
(Pokriefka 1983, 1984; Wright 1986, 1989; Lewis 1988b, §iv, n. 12; Wright 1989,
§ii; Yi 2001). Like Ayer’s criterion, all of these criteria for sentences are recursive
in that the background assumptions ϑ (the “other premises” with which a verifi-
able statement has to entail a directly verifiable statement) themselves only have
to be verifiable.21 Thus there is some reason to think that recursive criteria of
this kind are at the very least a dangerous direction of the search for a criterion
of empirical significance for sentences.22 This is of course no proof that there
cannot be a successful recursive criterion of empirical significance for sentences,
but arguably a reason for trying other directions first.
In contrast to Ayer, Carnap (1935, 11) writes: “A proposition P which is not
directly verifiable can only be verified by direct verification of propositions de-
duced from P together with other already verified propositions.” Like Ayer’s
21. Note the difference to Carnap’s recursive condition in “Testability and Meaning”, where the
background assumptions are fixed, but (essentially) the setB changes in each recursive step.
22. This is not true for the strongest criterion, translatability: Assume σ can be translated into
B -sentenceβ by ϑ and ϑ can be translated intoB -sentenceβ′ without background assumptions.
If B is only restricted by the terms it contains, ϑ is then a B -sentence and therefore σ itself is
aB -sentence. In this case, a definition of empirical significance as recursive translatability is safe,
but also pointless.
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definition of indirect verifiability, Carnap here essentially defines a sentence as
verifiable if and only if it hasB -content relative to other sentences. But in con-
trast to Ayer’s criterion, the other sentences in his criterion are required to be
not only verifiable, but actually verified. Unlike Ayer, Carnap does not define
‘verifiability’ recursively, but rather relative to a set of confirmed sentences.
Unfortunately, Carnap’s criterion fails for a different reason:
Claim 9. If there are at least two directly verified sentences β,γ with β 6` γ , then
any non-tautological sentence σ can be verified according to Carnap (1935, 11).
Proof. {(σ → γ )∧β} `β and is thus verified by β. Since {σ , (σ → γ )∧β} ` γ
while (σ→ γ )∧β 6` γ , σ is indirectly verifiable.
The problem, I surmise, is that Carnap implicitly confuses absolute and rel-
ative confirmation: Being verifiable is expressed by relative confirmability (via
claim 5), but the background assumptions used in deriving the content of a sen-
tence should not only have been relatively, but absolutely confirmed.
3.2 Criteria for Terms
Parallel to his criteria of empirical significance for sentences, Carnap also devel-
oped criteria for terms. Whenever he discusses these, he tries to make sure that
they run in parallel to his criteria for sentences. In the Aufbau, for instance, every
meaningful sentence is supposed to be translatable into a sentence about experi-
ences, and this means that “the concepts of science are explicitly definable on the
basis of observation concepts” (Carnap 1963a, 59). It is thus unsurprising that
Carnap also assumes for his criteria for terms that the background assumptions
are verified rather than verifiable sentences. For instance, when suggesting that
every scientific term can be explicitly defined inB -terms (Carnap 1928a, §38),23
Carnap (1928a, §67, §122) does not intend these definitions to follow from the
meanings of the terms outside of any empirical theory, but rather from the regu-
larities that are described by empirical theories (cf. Carnap 1967a, ix; 1963, 945).
In other words, he claims that these explicit definitions are entailed by scientific
theories.24
Definition 6. A relation A isB -definable in ϑ if and only if there is aB -formula
ϕ such that
ϑ ` ∀x1 . . . xn[Ax1 . . . xn↔ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)] . (2)
23. Carnap (1928a, §38) also discusses the need for “definitions in use”. As far as terms (i. e.,
non-logical symbols) are concerned, these are equivalent to explicit definitions because of the
eliminability theorems (cf. Gupta 2009, §2.3).
24. The definitions of the definability of constant or function symbols additionally contain
uniqueness conditions for the constants and function values, respectively. The conditions are
philosophically interesting because they introduce restrictions on the sets of sentences in which
constant and function symbols can be defined (Essler 1982, §14, §15; Hodges 1993, 59), but also
introduce technical subtleties that would lead the current discussion too far afield.
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When B -sentences are, as in the Aufbau, unrestricted in their logical form,
B -definability relates to translatability in a very straightforward sense:
Claim 10. IfB is only restricted by the terms it contains and if σ is a sentence of
B -terms andB -definable relations, then σ is translatable intoB .
Proof. If A isK -definable in ϑ, then for everyK ∪{A}-sentence σ there is aK -
sentence κ such that ϑ  σ↔ κ (Essler 1982, 103). Therefore, if theA -relations
in σ are {A1, . . . ,Ak+1}, σ can be translated into aB ∪{A1, . . . ,Ak}-sentence σk ,
and for 1 ≤ l ≤ k, σl can be translated into aB ∪{A1, . . . ,Al−1}-sentence σl−1,
with σ0 being aB -sentence.
With the assumption of theB -definability of allA -terms and a very inclu-
sive notion of ‘B -sentence’, Carnap therefore establishes the translatability of all
sentences σ intoB -sentences, and hence the equivalence of the ground of σ , the
content of σ , and σ itself, given the (reconstructed) theory. It is thus unfortunate
that Carnap had to give up this assumption.
In “Testability and Meaning” (Carnap 1936, 1937), Carnap relaxes his claim
of explicit definability of all scientific terms because he has come to the opinion
that it is impossible to define disposition terms explicitly in non-dispositional ob-
servational terms (Carnap 1936, 440). Instead, he suggests that new terms should
be introduced by reduction pairs (442):25
A pair of sentences of the forms
Q1 ⊃ (Q2 ⊃Q3) (R1)
Q4 ⊃ (Q5 ⊃∼Q3) (R2)
is called a reduction pair for ‘Q3’ provided ‘∼[(Q1 ·Q2)∨ (Q4 ·Q5)]
is not valid.
Here (R1), for instance, stands for ‘∀x[Q1x→ (Q2x→Q3x)]’ (434). A reduction
pair is “either laid down in order to introduce ‘Q3’ on the basis of Q1, Q2, Q4,
and Q5, or consequences of physical laws stated beforehand” (443). I will thus
call Q3 ‘introducible by reduction pairs from ϑ on the basis of {Q1,Q2,Q4,Q5}’
(or ‘introducible’ for short)26 and the conjunctions Q1x ∧Q2x and Q4x ∧Q5x
‘reduction formulas’ for Q3. Note that in this case the background assumptions ϑ
have to be known and can be analytic (when the reduction pair is “laid down”)
or synthetic (when the reduction pair is a consequence of “physical laws stated
beforehand”).
It is far from clear that reduction pairs suffice for analyzing the meaning of
disposition concepts (Belnap 1993, 136–37; Malzkorn 2001, §2.1). But empirical
25. Carnap also defines single reduction sentences, but these will not be relevant in the following.
As in the Aufbau, Carnap (1936, §16) assumes that there are different “sufficient bases” for the
reduction of scientific terms.
26. Carnap uses ‘reducible’ for another property of predicates. See the end of this section.
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significance differs from meaning,27 and introducibility may still be a criterion
of empirical significance. For one, it is obvious that everyB -definable relation is
also introducible by reduction sentences (with the two reduction formulas being
contradictories and thus ‘∀x¬[(Q1x ∧ Q2x) ∨ (Q4x ∧ Q5x)]’ a contradiction).
Introducibility is thus a straightforward weakening of a criterion of empirical
significance that is usually considered too strong.
The relation between introducible terms and the criteria for sentences dis-
cussed so far is complicated. For instance, a sentence σ containing only intro-
ducible predicates can be both unverifiable and unfalsifiable (as shown in the
appendix):
Claim 11. For some sentences ϑ there are simply existentially quantified sentences
σ∃ and simply universally quantified sentences σ∀ such that all terms of σ∃ and σ∀
are introducible by reduction pairs from ϑ, but σ∃ and σ∀ are neither verifiable nor
falsifiable relative to ϑ.
Carnap (1937, §25) was well aware that typically, universally quantified sen-
tences are not verifiable, existentially quantified sentences are not falsifiable, and
sentences with mixed quantifiers are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. Claim 11
however shows that once one allows introducible terms in a sentence, even some
simply quantified sentences are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. For simply uni-
versally quantified sentences this means that none of their unquantified instantia-
tions are falsifiable, which strongly suggests that the sentences are not empirical.
Conversely, some sentences containing only non-introducible predicates are
translatable.
Claim 12. For some sentences ϑ and sentences σ for whose terms ϑ entails neither
necessary nor sufficient conditions in B , σ can be non-trivially translated into B
by ϑ.
Proof. Let ϑ be the conjunction of (i) ∀x(A2x↔ x = b )∨∀x(A2x↔ x 6= b ),
( ii) ∀x(A1x ↔ Bx) ∨ (A1x ↔ ¬Bx), and (iii) ∃x[Bx ∧ ∀y(By → x = y)] ∧∃xy(¬Bx ∧ ¬By ∧ x 6= y). Then there are neither necessary nor sufficient con-
ditions for A1 or A2, and ∀x(A2x ↔ A1x) ∨ ∀x(A2x ↔ ¬A1x) can be trans-
lated into B -sentence Bb by ϑ: ∀x(A2x ↔ A1x) ∨ ∀x(A2x ↔ ¬A1x) and
(i) entail ∀x(A1x ↔ x = b ) ∨ ∀x(A1x ↔ x 6= b ), which with (ii) entails∀x(Bx↔ x = b )∨∀x(Bx↔ x 6= b ). With (iii), Bb follows. Conversely, Bb
and (i) entail ∀x(A2x ↔ Bx) ∨ ∀x(A2x ↔ ¬Bx) and hence with (ii) entail∀x(A2x↔A1x)∨∀x(A2x↔¬A1x).
If a term has neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition, it is a fortiori
not introducible.28 Introducibility therefore provides neither a necessary nor a
27. In short, ‘being empirical significant’ is a categorical predicate, while ‘the meaning of’ is a
function.
28. Incidentally, claim 12 can be cheaply proved by choosing ϑ = {β↔ σ} for anyB -sentence
β and any contingent sentence σ containing onlyA -terms. However, since ϑ is a claim of purely
propositional logic, this may go against the spirit of Carnap’s suggestion.
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sufficient condition for either verifiability, falsifiability, or translatability, at least
if the condition is to hold for all sentences and if it is to be based solely on
the introducibility or non-introducibility of the predicates occurring in the sen-
tences. It can of course be that this or one of the following criteria that turn out
problematic can be modified in a satisfying way. But here and in the following,
I am mainly interested in the viability of Carnap’s contributions to the search
for a criterion of empirical significance. Note also that a modification of intro-
ducibility would have to deviate significantly from Carnap’s suggestion, since it
can neither be a logical strengthening nor a logical weakening: Claim 11 shows
that introducibility leads to the inclusion of some very plausibly non-empirical
sentences, and claim 12 shows that introducibility leads to the exclusion of some
clearly empirical sentences.29
But things get still worse for criteria for terms, because Carnap (1936, 446)
extends introducibility to include the following recursion:
A (finite) chain of (finite) sets of sentences is called an introductive
chain based upon the class C of predicates if the following conditions
are fulfilled. Each set of the chain consists either of one definition
or of one or more reduction pairs for one predicate, say ‘Q’; every
predicate occurring in the set, other than ‘Q’, either belongs to C or
is such that one of the previous sets of the chain is either a definition
for it or a set of reduction pairs for it.
[ . . . ] If the last set of a given introductive chain based upon C
either consists in a definition for ‘Q’ or in a set of reduction pairs
for ‘Q’, ‘Q’ is said to be introduced by this chain on the basis of C .
Note that unlike in Ayer’s criterion, where ϑ is recursively defined, Carnap’s
criterion recursively defines the set C of terms.30 And since chain-introducibility
is relative to a theory ϑ, not all terms can be chain-introduced on the basis of C ,
that is, the definition cannot be trivial in the way that Ayer’s criterion and the
other recursive criteria for sentences are. But there are good reasons to think that
chain-introducibility is much too weak:
Claim 13. Some ϑ contain relations that are chain-introducible on the basis of C ,
but are not introducible on the basis of C and are completely unrestricted in their
interpretation by the interpretation of C .
Proof. Choose C = {B1,B2} and ϑ = ∀x[B1x → (B2x↔ A1x)] ∧ ∀x[¬B1x →
(A1x ↔ A2x)]. Then ϑ 6` ¬∃x(B1x ∧ B2x) and ϑ 6` ¬∃x(B1x ∧ ¬B2x), so that
A1 is introducible on the basis of {B1,B2}, and ϑ 6` ¬∃x(¬B1x ∧A1x) and ϑ 6`¬∃x(¬B1x ∧ ¬A1x), so that A2 is introducible on the basis of {B1,B2,A1} and
29. Besides explicit definitions and reduction pairs, Przełe˛cki (1969, ch. 7–8) also discusses sys-
tematic weakenings of reduction pairs.
30. This is just a shorthand: C stays the same, but for the recursive step, it does not matter
whether a term is in C or introducible through a chain of reduction pairs on the basis of C .
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thus chain-introducible on the basis of {B1,B2}. But the interpretation of A2 is
completely unrestricted: For any interpretation of B1 and B2, the extension of A1
is only determined within the extension of B1, but it determines the extension
of A2 only within the anti-extension of B1. It is clear that therefore A2 is also not
introducible on the basis of C .
Carnap (1936, 447, theorem 7) proves what seems to be, in contradiction to
the above result, the non-triviality of reductive chains. But his proof that “[i]f ‘P ’
is introduced by an introductive chain based upon C , ‘P ’ is reducible to C ” turns
out to be empty: The reducibility of a predicate is defined as the reducibility of
the confirmation of the predicate, which in turn is defined via the reducibility of
a literal involving the predicate (436). Since the reducibility of sentences is trivial,
so is the reducibility of predicates.31
Thus chain-introducibility is close to trivial, and there is no reason to believe
that all or only sentences containing only introducible terms are empirically sig-
nificant. But these negative results should not detract from the importance of
reduction pairs. In many cases in which an explicit definition for a term cannot
be given, one sufficient and one (different) necessary condition will often do,
and these can be phrased as reduction pairs. A special case of reduction pairs are
“bilateral reduction sentences” (Carnap 1936, 442–43), that is, conditional defini-
tions. These are ubiquitous in the empirical sciences (Schurz 2014, 248–49), and
even in mathematics, they seem to be more prevalent than definitions. For in-
stance, one does not define for any object that it is continuous in such and such
a case. Rather, one defines that a function is continuous in such and such a case.
And this is a conditional definition. Thus reduction pairs are important. Only, it
seems, not for empirical significance.
4 The United States
4.1 Criteria for Terms
On New Year’s Eve in 1935, Carnap presented a paper with the title “Testabil-
ity and Meaning” at a meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philo-
sophical Association (Benson 1963, item 1936-10), and less than a year later, he
emigrated to the United States (Carnap 1963a, 34). In a short contribution to the
Unity of Science Forum, Carnap (1938, fn. 1) summarizes “Testability and Mean-
ing” and points to the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (Carnap 1939) for an
elaboration of two methods of constructing a scientific language. One method
starts with “elementary” terms (B -terms) as primitive and successively intro-
duces “abstract” terms (A -terms) through reduction sentences as in “Testability
and Meaning”. The second method starts with abstract terms that are already
31. There could, of course, again be modifications of Carnap’s recursive step that do not trivi-
alize his criterion, but since even the recursion base is problematic, the search may not be worth
the effort.
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related to each other through the postulates of a theory. These abstract terms are
taken as primitive and further abstract terms are successively introduced to arrive
eventually at elementary terms. In the second method, Carnap suggests, it may
be possible to explicitly define all terms. In both methods, only the elementary
terms are directly interpreted. Carnap (1938, 34) claims:
The first way is interesting from the point of view of empiricism be-
cause it allows a closer check-up with respect to the empirical charac-
ter of the language of science. By beginning our construction at the
bottom, we see more easily whether and how each term proposed
for introduction is connected with possible observations.
With its reliance on reduction sentences, the first method is supposed to relate
abstract terms more easily to elementary terms.32 It is easy to see that the con-
ditions for abstract terms given by the second method can be very complicated.
For not all definitions of elementary terms in abstract terms lead to necessary or
sufficient conditions for the abstract terms. As an example, consider the defini-
tion of an elementary term B by four abstract terms A1,A2,A3,A4 in
∀x Bx↔ [(A1x ∧A2x)∨ (A3x ∧A4x)] . (3)
The applicability of B to any object is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
applicability of any of the four abstract terms,33 which are therefore also not
introducible by the definition (3) on the basis of {B}. Furthermore, the second
method does not demand that all abstract terms occur non-trivially in the def-
inition of an elementary term and some abstract terms may only be related to
other abstract terms through the postulates of the theory, which are not further
restricted.
In the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics itself, Carnap elaborates on the
distinction between the two methods for relating abstract and elementary terms
(figure 1). While the first method describes the observational import of abstract
terms very clearly, scientists “are inclined to choose the second method” (Carnap
1939, 206, emphasis removed). In “The Methodological Character of Theoretical
Concepts”, Carnap (1956, 53) puts this more forcefully:
At the time of [“Testability and Meaning”], I still believed that all sci-
entific terms could be introduced as disposition terms on the basis of
observation terms either by explicit definitions or by so-called reduc-
tion sentences. Today I think, in agreement with most empiricists,
that the connection between the observation terms and the terms of
theoretical science is much more weak than it was conceived [ . . . ]
in my earlier formulations [ . . . ].
32. Presumably because according to Carnap (1936, 447, thm. 7), it ensures that the abstract
terms are reducible to elementary terms.
33. Each abstract term is an inus condition for B (Mackie 1980, 62).
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Figure 1: Carnap’s two methods of giving an empirical interpretation to theoretical terms (adapted
from Carnap 1939, 205).
The second method of constructing terms made it necessary to find a new cri-
terion of empirical significance. Accordingly, Carnap (1956) goes on to develop
a weaker criterion for cases in which one cannot assume anything about the re-
lation between theB -terms and the rest of the scientific terms. In other words,
Carnap develops a criterion that works in a very general framework and for ar-
bitrary sentences. He only assumes higher order logic with semantic entailment
(51, 61), a theory ϑ consisting of the conjunction T .C of theoretical postulates T
and correspondence rules C ,34 and a language with an observational sublanguage
LO with sentences containing only observational terms (B -terms) and a theoret-
ical sublanguage LT with sentences that contain only terms from VT (A -terms).
The logical structure of LO (that is, B ) is much more inclusive compared to
“Testability and Meaning”, since it can contain quantifiers as long as they range
only over observable objects. B here seems to be very similar to the language
Carnap assumed for the description of “conceivable experiences” in Pseudoprob-
lems of Philosophy (Carnap 1928b, 327). Carnap’s suggestion for a new criterion
of significance is the following (Carnap 1956, 51):
A term ‘M ’ is significant relative to the class K of terms, with respect
to LT , LO , T , and C =Df the terms of K belong to VT , ‘M ’ belongs
to VT but not to K , and there are three sentences, SM and SK in LT
and SO in LO , such that the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) SM contains ‘M ’ as the only descriptive term.
(b) The descriptive terms in SK belong to K .
(c) The conjunction SM .SK .T .C is consistent (i. e., not logically
false).
34. The assumption that ϑ is a conjunction is not essential.
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(d) SO is logically implied by the conjunction SM .SK .T .C .
(e) SO is not logically implied by SK .T .C .
A major problem with the definition as it is stated is that, in contradiction to
Carnap’s intent (Carnap 1956, 53), it is not logically weaker than introducibility.
For assume
ϑ =
∧{∃x1x2[x1 6= x2 ∧∀y(y = x1 ∨ y = x2)], (4a)
∃x[Bx ∧∀y(By→ x = y)], (4b)
∀x(Ax↔ Bx)} . (4c)
A is evenB -definable in ϑ, but the only sentences that contain only A are either
incompatible with ϑ (and thus fall afoul of (c)) or imply no new sentence in LO
(and thus fall afoul of (d) and (e)).
The solution to this apparent inconsistency in Carnap’s claims is that Carnap,
first, treats mathematical constants as logical constants and, second, allows for
mathematical constants to have physical meaning and appear as arguments of
VT -relations. This becomes clear in Carnap’s argument that his definition is not
too narrow. To show this, Carnap (1956, 59) considers a specific example in which
one might think that his definition is too narrow, and argues that in this case,
there must be a possible distribution of values of M for the space-
time points of the region a′, which is compatible with T , C , and
S. Let ‘F ’ be a logical constant, designating a mathematical function
which represents such a value distribution. Then we take the follow-
ing sentence as SM : “For every space-time point in a′, the value of
M is equal to that of F .” [ . . . ] Then SM contains ‘M ’ as the only
descriptive term[.]
Carnap thus assumes that all mathematical terms are logical terms and can be
identified with theoretical terms that take space-time points as arguments. This
assumption seems to lead to a host of problems. For instance, if two theoretical
functions have the same values, they are identified with the same mathematical
function and are thus identical, which may lead to trouble if they are related
to different observation terms. It may thus be difficult to individuate theoretical
terms, and may require a reformulation of many scientific theories, assuming
that a consistent reformulation is even possible.
Avoiding the threat of inconsistency, one can read Carnap’s proof as relying
on the possibility of giving a direct interpretation to M . Thus SM is replaced by
an interpretation MA of some structure A, and the consistency of SM .SK .T .C is
expressed by A being a model of SK .T .C . Read like this, Carnap’s criterion of
significance can be rephrased as follows:35
35. Since Carnap (1956, 51,62) assumes that logical implication is given by semantic entailment,
I use ‘’ rather than ‘`’.
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Definition 7. A term M is Carnap-significant relative to the class K of terms
with respect to LT , LO , T , and C if and only if K ⊆ VT , M ∈ VT , M 6∈ K , and
there are an LO -sentence β, an extensionM of M , and a K -sentence κ such that
1. there is a model A of κ∧ϑ with MA =M,
2. every model A of κ∧ϑ with MA =M is also a model of β, and
3. κ∧ϑ 2β.
This can be stated more briefly:
Claim 14. A term M is Carnap-significant relative to the class K of terms with
respect to LT , LO , T , and C if and only if K ⊆VT , M ∈VT , M 6∈ K , and there are
an LO -sentence β and a K -sentence κ such that
∅⊂ {MA |A  κ∧ϑ ∧¬β} ⊂ {MA |A  κ∧ϑ} (5)
Proof. The first proper subset relation holds if and only if there is a model of
κ∧ϑ ∧¬β, that is, κ∧ϑ 6 β. The second proper subset relation holds if and
only if for some M there is a model of κ∧ϑ with MA =M but no such model
is also a model of ¬β. This holds if and only if for some M there is a model of
κ∧ϑ with MA =M and every such model is also a model of β.
The change from the notion of introducibility by reduction pairs is now
clear: With reduction pairs, some objects in the domain are included in the exten-
sion of the introduced predicate and some objects are excluded from the exten-
sion of the predicate. By contrast, in definition 7 some extensions for a predicate
are excluded. The inclusion of an extension is a special case of the exclusion of
extensions: If all extensions but one are excluded, the remaining extension is in-
cluded. Conversely, only one extension can be included, since then all others are
excluded. In a sense, Carnap has moved the criterion for significance of terms one
(type-theoretic) order higher, providing a necessary condition for an extension
being that of M (which sometimes amounts to a sufficient condition as well).
Unfortunately, Carnap goes further and gives a recursive definition of empir-
ical significance (Carnap 1956, 51):36
A term ‘Mn’ is significant with respect to LT , LO , T , and C =Df
there is a sequence of terms ‘M1’,. . . , ‘Mn’ of VT , such that every
term ‘Mi ’ ( i = 1, . . . ,n ) is significant relative to the class of those
terms which precede it in the sequence, with respect to LT , LO , T ,
and C .
Given that significance was meant to be weaker than reducibility, it is not surpris-
ing that relations with completely unrestricted interpretations can be significant
(under Carnap’s assumptions for his proof that his criterion is not too narrow):
36. Note that here, too, it is the set K of terms that is recursively defined, not ϑ (here: T .C ).
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Claim 15. Assuming that there is a constant symbol c so that A1c and A2c are still
considered to contain only A1 and A2, respectively, some ϑ contain relations that
are significant according to Carnap (1956), but are completely unrestricted in their
interpretation.
Proof. Choose ϑ = ∀x(Bx → A1x)∧∀x(¬Bx ∧A1x → A2x). Then ϑ ∧¬A1c `¬Bc while ϑ 6` ¬Bc , and ϑ∧A1c∧¬A2c ` ¬Bc while ϑ∧A1c 6` ¬Bc . But, similar
to the proof of claim 13, A2 is completely unrestricted in its interpretation.
In response to Kaplan (1975) and Van Cleve (1971),37 Creath (1976) suggests
a recursive criterion of empirical significance for terms formulated in analogy
to Carnap’s criterion, but weaker (see Justus, forthcoming, §4). Since it seems
that Carnap’s definition is already too weak, this direction of the search for a
criterion does not seem very fruitful.38
As in the case of introducibility and chain-introducibility, that Carnap’s full
criterion is close to trivial should not distract from its interesting recursion base.
Having a necessary condition for the extension of some predicate M is often a sig-
nificant step forward, and is sometimes all that is needed. The best example here
is possibly Tarski’s necessary condition for the extension of a truth-predicate.39
Thus the recursion base of Carnap’s criterion is again an interesting and impor-
tant concept, although not for empirical significance.
Carnap (1956, 49) also suggests another interesting concept. After giving ex-
amples of correspondence rules (C -rules), he states:
In the above examples, the C -rules have the form of universal postu-
lates. A more general form would be that of statistical laws involving
the concept of statistical probability [ . . . ]. A postulate of this kind
might say, for example, that, if a region has a certain state specified in
theoretical terms, then there is a probability of 0.8 that a certain ob-
servable event occurs [ . . . ]. Or it might, conversely, state the prob-
ability for the theoretical property, with respect to the observable
event.
This generalization of the correspondence rules would, if worked out, lead to a
generalization of his criterion of significance as well. Thus in “The Methodolog-
ical Character of Theoretical Concepts”, Carnap hints at the to my knowledge
only probabilistic criterion for the empirical significance of terms.
37. Formula (3) is closely related to the method of “de-Occamization” suggested by Van Cleve
(reported by Creath 1976, 397). Using claim 14, it is easy to see that in formula (3), none of the
A -terms is Carnap-significant relative to ∅.
38. However, the recursion base of Creath’s criterion seems to me more promising than the full
definition, because it already allows for determining whether a whole set of terms is significant. It
thus could arguably be a non-trivial substitute for Carnap’s recursive definition.
39. In Tarski’s fortunate case, the necessary condition is so strong that it provides a sufficient
condition as well.
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4.2 Criteria for Sentences
In “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”, Carnap (1956, 60)
also gives a criterion for sentences:
An expression A of LT is a significant sentence of LT =Df
(a) A satisfies the rules of formation of LT ,
(b) every descriptive constant in A is a significant term (in the sense
of d2).
d2 is just the recursive definition of significance for terms that Carnap gives in
the same article. This seems to be the first time that Carnap explicitly defines a
sentence as significant if and only if it contains only significant terms.40
Even using only the recursion base of the definition of significant terms, how-
ever, it is possible to construct out of significant terms sentences that are not
verifiable or falsifiable:
Claim 16. For some sentences ϑ there are simply existentially quantified sentences σ∃
and simply universally quantified sentences σ∀ such that all terms of σ∃ and σ∀ are
significant relative to ∅ but σ∃ and σ∀ are neither verifiable nor falsifiable relative
to ϑ.
Proof. As the proof of claim 11.
Obviously, things will not get better when the recursion step of the definition
of significant terms is taken into account.41
There is also the worry that Carnap’s criterion is incompatible with the mo-
tivation that he provides for it. Carnap (1956, 49) writes:
My task is to explicate the concept of empirical meaningfulness of
theoretical terms. [ . . . ] In preparation for the task of explication, let
me try to clarify the explicandum somewhat more, i. e., the concept
of empirical meaningfulness in its presystematic sense. [ . . . ] What
does it mean for ‘M ’ to be empirically meaningful? Roughly speak-
ing, it means that a certain assumption involving the magnitude M
40. In “Testability and Meaning”, Carnap (1937, 34) states that in confirmable sentences (which
are used to define the principle of empiricism), “[p]redicates which are confirmable [ . . . ] are
admitted”, but this does not mean that only confirmable predicates are admitted. As far as I can tell,
Carnap (1936, 457, thm. 10) also proves only that a sentence containing exclusively confirmable
predicates is itself confirmable. Hempel (1950, 51) may have intended his claim that the approach
defining significant sentences via significant terms “has its origin in Carnap’s essay, Testability and
Meaning” as a historical rather than logical remark. The criterion he discusses (definition 3.2),
which demands that a significant sentence must contain only observable terms or those definable
in observable terms, is his own. It did not originate with “Testability and Meaning”, as Soames
(2003, 292) claims.
41. Accordingly, I do not agree with the optimistic evaluation of Carnap’s criterion by Justus
(forthcoming), although I am optimistic about some of Carnap’s other criteria.
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makes a difference for the prediction of an observable event. More
specifically, there must be a certain sentence SM about M such that
we can infer with its help a sentence SO in LO .
So it seems that Carnap already makes a substantial assumption about what
makes a sentence significant: We must be able to “infer with its help a sentence
SO in LO”, which essentially means that the sentence has to have LO -content, and
indeed, the conditions (c), (d), and (e) of Carnap’s criterion for terms are exactly
those of definition 4. But in that case, there is no need for any further definitions,
which can at best be redundant, and at worst (as in this case) incompatible with
the definition of empirical significance as having LO -content.
It would be puzzling if Carnap had not seen this tension. And indeed, there
is a possible solution to this puzzle. Carnap’s intent may have been to define
empirically significant sentences so that all subformulas of a significant sentence
are themselves significant.42 In that case, every significant sentence must have
LO -content, but the inverse would not have to hold; the sentence SM would be
significant because it has LO -content and no subformulas. It is only because there
are sentences that are significant according to Carnap’s definition but do not have
LO -content that another tension arises. But this one is not particularly obvious,
and so might have been overlooked by Carnap.43
In a discussion of meaning and verifiability, Carnap (1963b, 887) remarks that
the above criterion for the significance of terms “represents an explication of the
requirement of confirmability in a modified form”, where the requirement of
confirmability is one thesis of empiricism (874):
Principle of confirmability. If it is in principle impossible for any con-
ceivable observational result to be either confirming or disconfirm-
ing evidence for a linguistic expression A, then expression A is devoid
of cognitive meaning.
Since verifiability and falsifiability entail confirmability, this principle of con-
firmability is equivalent to the one suggested by Carnap (1928b, 327) early on
in Pseudoproblems of Philosophy. It seems, then, that Carnap’s philosophical posi-
tion has changed very little, although decades of technical work lie between these
two statements of empiricism. It is this position that, for example, led Skyrms
42. I thank Richard Creath for this point.
43. Besides this tension, the passage quoted above is connected to another lacuna. Carnap follows
it up by in effect spelling out the different conditions of his criterion, and concludes with: “On the
basis of the preceding considerations, I shall now give definitions for the concept of significance[.]”
(Carnap 1956, 51). But as a first step of an explication, the determination of the explicandum, it
is remarkably poor. There is no investigation of actual usage or practically clear cases as Carnap
(1950a, 4) in his elucidation of explication demands, but rather the use of pure intuition on compa-
rably technical matters of deductive inferences, which one may share or not. Furthermore, Carnap
also does not show the criterion’s fruitfulness for the formulation of many universal statements,
which is arguably the central requirement of a good explication (7). Finally, Carnap provides a jus-
tification for his criterion for terms, but gives no justification at all for his criterion for sentences.
(I thank Christopher French for discussions and his spirited defense of Carnap in this matter.)
28
Sebastian Lutz Carnap on Empirical Significance—Preprint
(1984, 14–15) to a Bayesian criterion of empirical significance that is equivalent to
the demand that a significant sentence be confirmable or disconfirmable in the
probabilistic sense.
5 Success
I have argued that despite his unshaken position on the form of a criterion of em-
pirical significance, Carnap’s technical endeavours bore mixed results at best. His
criteria for terms do not seem to be usable for identifying significant sentences or
are next to trivial, the suggested equivalence between the ground and the content
of a sentence seems false, and the claim of translatability by stipulation is but
a tantalizing suggestion. I now want to argue that his more successful technical
endeavours in a slightly different context were so successful that they solve the
problem of finding a criterion of significance as well, albeit only for deductive
inferences.
In response to Hempel’s criticism of the analytic-synthetic distinction
(Carnap 1963b, 964), Carnap (1958, §4) argued that, without taking back-
ground assumptions into account, the synthetic component of a sentence
σ(B1, . . . ,Bm ,A1, . . . ,An) that contains the basic terms B1, . . . ,Bm and auxiliary
terms A1, . . . ,An can be identified with its Ramsey sentence
RB (σ) := ∃X1 . . .Xnσ
 
B1, . . . ,Bm ,X1, . . . ,Xn

, (6)
which results from σ by existentially generalizing on allA -terms in σ .44 RB (σ)
entails the same B -sentences as σ (Rozeboom 1962, 291–93) so that it is the
content of σ , RB (σ) ` C` (σ). The underlying assumption is that B is only re-
stricted in its non-logical symbols; quantifiers and connectives can occur in any
combination and can range over any objects. For this reason, Carnap speaks of
the ‘extended observation language’ (Psillos 2000b, 158–59). This is a significant
change from Carnap’s earlier assumptions aboutB , which typically requiredB
to contain only conjunctions of literals and even in “The Methodological Char-
acter of Theoretical Concepts” contains only sentences whose quantifiers range
over observable objects. It is the notion ofB -sentence that Carnap last used in
the Aufbau.
After having loosened the relation betweenB - andA -terms in Foundations
of Logic and Mathematics, Carnap has taken another essential step towards the
unification of verifiability, falsifiability, and translatability. The final step makes
use of the fact that the Ramsey sentence provides a closed expression for the
empirical content of any sentence. It consists in Carnap’s suggestion to use the
(by now) so-called Carnap sentence
CB (σ) = RB (σ)→ σ (7)
44. Psillos (2000a, §4) argues that Carnap rediscovered the Ramsey sentence while trying to
generalize Craig’s theorem to type theory.
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as the analytic component of σ .45 As analytic sentence, CB (σ) can be treated as a
background assumption. After all, it is not under scrutiny when testing empirical
claims. Taking CB (σ) as background assumption provides an immediate advan-
tage over the choice of not further specified “laws of nature” or similar, since the
status of CB (σ) is completely clear: It is an analytic sentence, and specifically
the analytic component of a known (or conjectured) theory.46 And with this
choice of the background assumptions, Carnap’s claims over the decades come
together in one clean expression. As noted in connection with the general rela-
tion between ground and content of a sentence (1), ground and content are not
equivalent for every sentence σ and all background assumptions ϑ. But the Car-
nap sentence CB (σ) renders a component of σ itself a background assumption,
and as is easily shown (see also Winnie 1970, eq. 6),
CB (σ) ` σ↔ RB (σ) , (8)
that is, σ is translatable intoB relative to CB (σ), and
G(σ)∧CB (σ) ` C` (σ)∧CB (σ) , (9)
that is, the ground of σ is equivalent to the content of σ . Thus the weakest
sentence that entails σ is also the strongest one entailed by σ and the content of
a sentence is trivial if and only if its ground is trivial. And now, after a search of
thirty years for a technical expression of empirical significance, after a change of
the semantics of scientific terms, a change of the notion of a basic sentence, and
the rediscovery of the Ramsey sentence, the following holds for the criteria of
empirical significance for sentences:
Claim 17. IfB is only restricted by the terms it contains, the following statements
are equivalent:
1. σ is non-trivially translatable intoB by CB (σ).
2. σ is non-trivially verifiable inB relative to CB (σ).
3. σ is non-trivially falsifiable inB relative to CB (σ).
4. σ has non-trivial content inB relative to CB (σ).
Proof. Choose RB (σ) as the translation, the content, and the verifying sentence
of σ , and choose ¬RB (σ) as its falsifying sentence. Since formula (8) holds, the
conditions for non-trivial translatability, verifiability, falsifiability, and having
non-trivial content are equivalent to 6` RB (σ), which entails CB (σ) 6` σ .
45. For the conjunction of two reduction pairs, Carnap (1936, §10) already describes an equiva-
lent method in “Testability and Meaning” (cf. Carnap 1963b, 964–65).
46. That this does not render claims of empirical significance preliminary or knowledge depen-
dent is shown in §6.1.
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Thus a sentence that is non-trivially significant, by either being verifiable,
falsifiable, or having content, is also non-trivially translatable, and so indeed for
deductive inferences, all criteria for sentences become one. As Carnap (1936, 420)
had put it over 20 year earlier, “the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense
identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has
meaning only if such a determination is possible”.47
6 Concluding Thoughts on the Criteria
Carnap (1963b, 962) defines the “O-content of S relative to TC ” as the B -
sentences entailed by S ∧TC (so that a sentence with empty O-content has no
non-trivial content inB according to definition 4) and notes that S may entail
inductive relations beyond those entailed by its O-content. But “although it can-
not replace S completely, the O-content of S relative to a given theory TC may
still be taken as an explication for the experiential import (or, if one prefers, the
deductive experiential import) of S”. Thus for Carnap, the Ramsey sentence of
σ does not cover the inductive content of σ , and hence the success of the Carnap
sentence is restricted to deductive inferences. As far as criteria of empirical signif-
icance are concerned, this encompasses verification, falsification, and translation.
The search for a closed expression of inductive content, an inductive analogue to
the Carnap sentence, and thus a solution to the problem of inductive confirma-
bility is not over. In the remainder of this essay, however, I will instead focus on
the features of Carnap’s solution for deductive inferences.
6.1 The Role of the Ramsey and the Carnap Sentence
To a certain extent, Carnap’s use of the Ramsey sentence even provides a re-
sponse to an influential argument by Hempel (1951, 74), who shows the intuitive
inadequacy of a number of extant criteria of empirical significance under the
assumption that B contains only conjunctions of literals. He concludes that
“cognitive significance in a system is a matter of degree” and sees this as a reason
for disposing of the concept altogether. Instead of “dichotomizing this array [of
systems] into significant and non-significant systems”, he states, one should com-
pare systems of sentences by their precision, systematicity, simplicity, and level
of confirmation. But in a way, Carnap’s use of the Ramsey sentence makes empir-
ical significance a matter of degree without retreating to such notoriously elusive
concepts as systematicity or simplicity: The logical strength of the Ramsey sen-
tence can be seen as the degree to which a sentence is empirically significant (or,
better: the degree to which it has content), with a tautological Ramsey sentence
a mark of non-falsifiability:
47. The criticism by Demopoulos (2007, vii) that, essentially, the Carnap sentence renders a
theory analytically equivalent to its content inB is therefore but an expression of Carnap’s con-
ception of empiricism.
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Claim 18. IfB is only restricted by the terms it contains, σ has non-trivial content
inB if and only if 6` RB (σ).
Proof. RB (σ) ` R`B
 
σ ∧ CB (σ)

and thus RB (σ) entails the same B -sentences
as σ relative to CB (σ).
This feature of Carnap’s approach is again nicely illustrated by a discussion
about the existence of God, which also sheds some light on Flew’s argument.
Adams (2011a) presents, according to his own summary (Adams 2011b) the fol-
lowing argument:48
1. [ . . . ] Thomas Aquinas reasoned that the universe must have a
First Cause, to which he assigned the name God.
2. Modern physicists in their way are likewise in search of a First
Cause.
3. If the physicists succeed, one taking the Thomistic view of
things might reasonably call that First Cause God.
In reply to a strongly-worded criticism by a pseudonymous author, Adams
(2011b) points out the following implication of his argument:
Can we identify some fundamental principle or essence at the root
of the universe and define that as the deity? Sure. Does doing so pro-
vide us with grounds for belief in a benevolent, all-knowing Creator?
Clearly not. [ . . . ] To put it another way, the more closely we exam-
ine arguments for the existence of God, the more surely traditional
belief in the deity slips from our grasp.
The claim that God exists if a first cause exists plays the role of a Carnap sen-
tence, and it reduces the content of the claim ‘God exists’ to nothing more than
the claim ‘There is some first cause’,49 which plays the role of the Ramsey sen-
tence. And this Ramsey sentence may have a completely non-theistic instantia-
tion. Thus even if someone might respond to Flew’s challenge to name a sen-
tence that would disproof the existence of God with ‘There is no first cause’,
this would be cold comfort for someone who expects God to be benevolent and
all-knowing.
Claim 18 also establishes that the empirical significance of σ is independent
of the background assumptions, or rather, since σ determines the background
assumptions CB (σ), σ itself alone already determines whether it is significant.
Thus in spite of the background assumptions being the analytic component of a
known (or conjectured) theory, one can make definitive, non-preliminary claims
about σ ’s significance.
The price to pay for the connection between content, background assump-
tions, and empirical significance is, as pointed out, that theB -sentences must not
48. Whether his interpretation of Thomas Aquinas is correct is irrelevant for my discussion.
49. The term ‘God’ thus must be defined as entailing a first cause.
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be restricted to conjunctions of literals, but must include unrestrictedly quanti-
fied sentences. This solution should not have been anathema to Hempel, since
he himself uses type theory to arrive at explicit definitions for real-valued mea-
surement results in observational terms (Hempel 1958, 64–67). He notes that this
“price will be considered too high” by some, but adds that “it would no doubt
be generally considered a worthwhile advance in clarification if for a set of the-
oretical scientific expressions explicit definitions in terms of observables can be
constructed at all” (65–66). Similarly, having a criterion of empirical significance
(and empirical content) at all should be worth the price of extending one’s basic
language as well.
Nonetheless, one may hope for a more general account of the empirical sig-
nificance (and the content) of a sentence σ , one that allows placing more restric-
tions on the sentences inB . For this aim, one could rely on a new definition of
the content C (σ) of sentence σ inB relative to ϑ, defining it as the set
{% |σ ∧ϑ ` % and % ∈B} .50 (10)
The problem is that C (σ) may be an infinite set, and thus cannot be used as the
antecedent of an implication in the same way that the Ramsey sentence is used
in the Carnap sentence. This problem can be solved by treating the background
assumptions not as sets of sentences but rather as inference rules, as Carnap often
did.51 Then one can define the analytic component of σ as the inference rule
C (σ) ` σ . (11)
The resulting inference system is not particularly graceful, for instance because
it depends on the sentence σ , so that it differs from sentence to sentence. But in
this inference system,
σ ` C` (σ) , (12)
which can be defined as the translatability of σ into a set of B -sentences, and
which is non-trivial if and only if C (σ) is neither contradictory nor tautologous.
Correspondingly, one can define σ to be (non-trivially) verifiable if and only if
there is a consistent set Ω of B -sentences such that Ω ` σ (and 6` σ ). One can
define σ to be (non-trivially) falsifiable if and only if there is a consistent set
Ω of B -sentences such that Ω ` ¬σ (and 6` ¬σ ). As with the Carnap sentence,
non-trivial verifiability, falsifiability, and translatability then are equivalent given
the analytic component of σ . This solution allows more freedom with respect to
the choice ofB , although it still does not establish the equivalence for verifiabil-
ity, falsifiability, and translatability in the sense of Carnap’s early works, where
Carnap relied on single conjunctions of literals asB -sentences.
50. The discussion here and in the following ignores problems stemming from the incomplete-
ness of deduction in higher order logic for Tarski semantics. One could avoid any such problems
by switching either to semantic entailment or to Henkin semantics.
51. This strategy is not that uncommon, for example when ðx 6= yñ is defined in the metalan-
guage of a logic as an abbreviation for ð¬x = yñ, without introducing a corresponding axiom into
the language.
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6.2 Metaphysics and the Criteria for Terms
Maybe the most impressive aspect of the Carnap sentence is that it ensures the
translatability of any theory. Carnap’s only previous attempt at establishing the
translatability of a theory was in the Aufbau. Like the Carnap sentence approach,
the Aufbau relies on the very inclusive notion ofB that only restricts the terms
that B may contain, not the logical structure of B -sentences. But the Aufbau
places enormous restrictions on the logical form of scientific theories, since it
requires the definability of allA -terms inB -terms. By contrast, the Carnap sen-
tence approach places no restrictions whatsoever on a theory σ . However, this
very flexibility is also the most threatening aspect for Carnap’s original program,
the criticism of metaphysics: σ may be any sentence, and thus also a sentence like
‘The Absolute is perfect’, which is thus translatable and also verified by its transla-
tion. However, this qualification of Carnap’s success must itself be qualified: On
its own, ‘The Absolute is perfect’ (in symbols: Pa ) contains no B -terms, and
thus its Ramsey sentence is the tautology ∃Y∃xY x. The sentence’s verifiability
and translatability are thus trivial: It is an analytic truth, and thus trivially veri-
fied by and trivially translated into a tautology. It also cannot be falsified, since
any falsifying sentence would have to be incompatible with the background as-
sumptions, which is impossible. Thus as long as metaphysicians do not connect
their sentences to B -sentences, they may not be speaking nonsense, but also
make no claims about the world. They are engaged in language choice. Hence
Carnap’s criticism of metaphysics only has to be reformulated. Metaphysical sen-
tences are problematic, as Carnap originally claimed, but not because they are
meaningless, but because they are pseudo-synthetic (cf. Diamond 1975, 16–20).
Thus it seems that Carnap’s system has a place for all sentences, metaphysical
ones and also sentences about values: If the latter connect to value experiences
and thus to emotions as in the Aufbau, they amount to empirical statements. If
they have no contact at all to B -sentences, they are analytic.52 Given its inclu-
siveness, the different criteria of empirical significance for terms may find their
place in Carnap’s system as well. For even if some non-significant sentence con-
tains only terms that fulfill one of the different criteria, since that sentence is
simply analytic, its terms do not have to be treated as meaningless, but rather
as conventionally chosen. Thus one obvious role for the criteria is the identifi-
cation of terms that can be chosen for specific roles. Introducible terms can be
used for identifying specific kinds objects, terms that are significant according to
the recursion base of the definition given in “The Methodological Character of
Theoretical Concepts” identify specific kinds of properties. Terms that are sig-
nificant according to other criteria may identify specific groups of properties.53
Thus in spite of their questionable help in identifying significant sentences or
even significant terms, criteria for the significance of terms may have important
52. Thus it seems that “pure optatives” (proposals, requests, demands, etc. that do not assert any
matters of fact) are analytic, contrary to Carnap’s claims (cf. Carnap 1963b, 32.b).
53. The recursion base of the criterion by Creath (1976) may fit the bill.
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uses in analyzing the components of a theory.
It seems then that, as far as deductive inference is concerned, Carnap’s search
for a criterion of empirical significance for sentences was a success, and his search
for a criterion for terms was useful in producing tools for the analysis of terms.
With respect to inductive inferences, Carnap suggested the only criterion for
terms, and his position towards a criterion for sentences can be spelled out in
Bayesian terms if inductive inferences are explicated probabilistically. Abject fail-
ures look different.
A Further Proofs
Claim 3. If all occurring probabilities are defined and B contains with every sen-
tence also its negation, then σ is disconfirmable if and only if σ is confirmable.
Proof.
P(σ |ϑ)> P(σ |β∧ϑ) = P(β |σ ∧ϑ)P(σ |ϑ)
P(β |ϑ) =
1−P(¬β |σ ∧ϑ)P(σ |ϑ)
1−P(¬β |ϑ)
⇔ P(¬β |ϑ)< P(¬β |σ ∧ϑ)
⇔ P(σ |ϑ)< P(¬β |σ ∧ϑ)P(σ |ϑ)
P(¬β |ϑ) = P(σ |¬β∧ϑ) (13)
Claim 11. For some sentences ϑ there are simply existentially quantified sentences
σ∃ and simply universally quantified sentences σ∀ such that all terms of σ∃ and σ∀
are introducible by reduction pairs from ϑ, but σ∃ and σ∀ are neither verifiable nor
falsifiable relative to ϑ.
Proof. Choose ϑ = ∀x[B1x → (B2x ↔ A1x)] ∧ ∀x[¬B1x → (B2x ↔ A2x)].
Then σ∃ = ∃x(A1x ∧A2x) is not falsifiable relative to ϑ:
` ∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔ λy[B2y ∨¬B1y]x)]
∧∀x[¬B1x→ (B2x↔ λy[B2y ∨B1y]x)]
∧∃x[λy(B2y ∨¬B1y)x ∧λy(B2y ∨B1y)x]
(14a)
` ∃X1X2
 ∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔X1x)]
∧∀x[¬B1x→ (B2x↔X2x)]
∧∃x[X1x ∧X2x]
 (14b)
` RB (ϑ ∧σ∃) (14c)
Since the Ramsey sentence of σ∃ ∧ ϑ entails the same B -sentences as σ∃ ∧ ϑ,
σ∃ ∧ϑ and specifically σ∃ does not entail any B -sentences not already entailed
by ϑ alone. Since a sentence is verifiable if and only if its negation is falsifiable
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(Hempel 1950, 48), a similar argument can be used to show that σ∃ is also not
verifiable relative to ϑ:
` ∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔ λy[B2y ∧B1y]x)]
∧∀x[¬B1x→ (B2x↔ λy[B2y ∧¬B1y]x)]
∧¬∃x[λy(B2y ∧B1y)x ∧λy(B2y ∧¬B1y)x]
(15a)
` ∃X1X2
 ∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔X1x)]
∧∀x[¬B1x→ (B2x↔X2x)]
∧¬∃x[X1x ∧X2x]
 (15b)
` RB (ϑ ∧¬σ∃) (15c)
Similarly, it can be shown that σ∀ = ∀x(A1x↔A2x) is not falsifiable relative to
ϑ:
` ∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔ B2x)]∧∀x[¬B1x→ (B2x↔ B2x)]
∧∀x(B2x↔ B2x) (16a)
` ∃X1X2
 ∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔X1x)]∧∀x[¬B1x→ (B2x↔X2x)]
∧∀x[X1x↔X2x]
(16b)
` RB (ϑ ∧σ∀) (16c)
And it can be shown that σ∀ is not verifiable relative to ϑ:
` ∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔ λy[(B2y ∧B1y)∨ (¬B2y ∧¬B1y)]x)]
∧∀x[¬B1x→ (B2x↔ λy[(B2y ∧¬B1y)∨ (¬B2y ∧B1y)]x)]
∧ ¬∀x(λy[(B2y ∧B1y)∨ (¬B2y ∧¬B1y)]x
↔ λy[(B2y ∧¬B1y)∨ (¬B2y ∧B1y)]x)
(17a)
` ∃X1X2
 ∀x[B1x→ (B2x↔X1x)]
∧∀x[¬B1x→ (B2x↔X2x)]
∧¬∀x[X1x↔X2x]
 (17b)
` RB (ϑ ∧¬σ∀) (17c)
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